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No. 80-1199 - AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. v. PATTERSON

Justice White, dissenting.
Section

703(h)

of

Title

VII,

42

U.S.C

§

2000e-2(h),

provides that:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this
subchapter,
it
shall
not
be
an
unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a · bona fide seniority or merit
system,
provided that such differences are
not the result of an intention to discriminate
because
of
race,
color,
religion,
sex,
or
national origin, •..• "
A plurality

of

sitting

bane,

en

the

§703(h)

Court
has

of

Appeals

construed

the

for

the

Fourth

protections

-

Circuit,

afforded

by

-------

to any seniority system instituted after
""'-- ~ -----\_
-....__
the effective date of Title VII. The plurality based its holding
...._______.....__.. " - -

---------

~

~

in part on its view that the legislative history of §703(h) was
"replete with indications" which "conclusively demonstrates that

'•

.

-2-

Congress

intended

the

immunity

accorded

seniority · systems

by

§703(h) to run only to those systems in existence at the time of
Title VII's

effective

date,

and of

applications of such systems."

course

to

Accordingly,

routine post-Act

the plurality held

that post-Act seniority systems should be assessed under the test

u.s.

articulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
not

under

the more

relaxed

standard announced

Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,

431

424 (1971), and
in International

u.s.

324

(1977),

for challenges to bona fide seniority systems adopted before the
effective

date

system at

question

found

to

of

violate

violation

had

Title VII.
in

this

Griggs,

Since

part of

the

the

the case had

plurality

been demonstrated with

particular

held

seniority

already been

that

a

Title VII

respect to the particular

seniority system at issue.l
In

my

view,

the

Fourth

Circuit

has

decided

an

important

question of federal law which this Court should review.
nothing

in

distinction
directs

that

the

language

drawn
bona

by
fide

the

of

§703(h)

court

seniority

supports

below.

On

the

its

First,

bright-line

face,

systems can only be

§703 (h)
found

to

violate Title VII if they intentionally discriminate on the basis

1 The original panel found that the seniority system
in question was not "bona fide," within the meaning of
§703(h).
See Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 586 F.2d
300, 303 (CA4 1978).
The plurality did not rely on this
ground, however, but instead based its decision on the
nonapplicability of §703(h) to seniority systems enacted
after the effective date of Title VII.
Similarly, the
Fourth Circuit specifically refused to base its decisions on
respondents'
argument
that
the
specific
system
under
consideration was not in fact a seniority system within the
meaning of §703(h). 634 F.2d, at 749 n.3.

-3-

of race, sex, or other statutorily prohibited bases . . There is no
indication in the text of the provision that Congress

intended

bona fide seniority systems imposed after the effective date of
Title VII to be treated in a fashion different from pre-effective
date systems.
It

is

also

not

clear

that

the

Fourth

Circuit's

decision

follows directly from the legislative history.

The court below

relied

the

primarily

on

various

statements

from

legislative

history indicating that Title VII was not intended to undermine
"established" or "existing" seniority rights.
7213

See 110 Cong. Rec.

(1964) (Memorandum of Sen. Clark and Sen. Case); id., at 7207

(Justice Department comments).

The Fourth Circuit was

that Title VII in general, and §703(h)

correct

in particular, evidence a

concern that seniority rights already vested at the time of the
effective date of Title VII should be protected.
necessarily
intended

to

follow

from

protect

this

observation

that

subsequently-imposed

a

speculative

enterprise

given

language in the statute itself.
prepared

to

say

that

the

the

§703 (h)

seniority

Reading such negative implications into the
is

But it does not
not

systems.

legislative history

lack

of

any

As presently advised,

legislative

was

history

limiting
I

am not

constitutes

a

"clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary" of the
statute's otherwise clear language.
Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
Nor

is

the

See Consumer Products Safety

u.s.

reading given §703 (h)

by

102, 108 (1980).
the court of Appeals

obviously consistent with the Court's prior constructions of that
Section.

In Teamsters,

the Court stated that "the unmistakable

.

-4-

purpose of §703(h) was to make clear that the routine · application
of a bona fide seniority system would not be unlawful under Title
431

VII."

Hardison,

U.S.,

at

u.s.

432

discriminatory

352.

63, 82

purpose,

See

Trans
(~703

(1977)
the

World

Airlines,

Inc.

v.

(h) provides that "absent a

operation

of

a

seniority

system

cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the system has
some

discriminatory

consequences").

The

Court

has

also noted

that Title VII was passed "against the backdrop of this Nation's
longstanding

policy

labor

representatives of employers and
collective

bargaining

to

leaving

of

employees

establish

(1980).
at

Brewers

Association

v.

the

freedom

conditions

applicable to a particular business or
California

the

to

of

chosen
through

employment

industrial environment."

Bryant,

444

U.S.

598,

608

While none of these cases considered the exact question

issue

in

this

case,

result contrary to

and

thus

do

not

the decision below,

necessarily

require

a

it is equally true that

the Court has never suggested that the effective date of Title
VII

makes

§703 (h)

any

difference

in

terms

of

the

applicability

of

0

Finally, while the Fourth Circuit's decision is in accord with
the

present

position

of

tpe

Equal

Employment

Opportunity

"')

Commission,2 it is i ~conflict w ~ th decisions of other Courts of
Appeals

that

have

routinely

applied

Teamsters

to

post-Act

2 See EEOC Notice, No. N-915 (,.uly 14, 1977) (EEOC's
position is that "a seniority system is protected under
Section 703(h) only if it was instituted prior to the
effective date of Title VII").

-5-

imposition

or

revision

of

Alexander v. Aero Lodge No.
cert.

denied,

436

u.s.

Association of Bridge,
637 F. 2d 506, 516

seniority

systems.

735, 565 F.2d 1364

946

(1978);

Structural

Hameed

See,

~,

(6th Cir. 1977),
v.

International

and Ornamental

Iron Workers,

(CAS 1980) .

Given the above concerns and the obvious importance of the
issue

presented

with

respect

to

the

validity

of

all

recently

adopted seniority systems, an issue which will necessarily recur
time and again, I would issue the writ of certiorari.

Preliminary Memo

April 17, 1981 Conference
List 1, Sheet 2
No. 80-1199
AMERICAN
TOBACCO CO. ,
et al. ~

Cert to CA 4
(Haynsworth, Hall
& Phillips; Winter
& Butzner, concurring
& dissenting; Widener
& Russell, concurring
& dissenting)
Federal/Civil

v.
PATTERSON,
et al. ~

1.

SUMMARY:

______

Timely

Petrs argue t hat the CA4 improperly refused to

--

:...-;;.....§703(h)
....,..........__________
apply
of Title VII, as construed in Internation a l

Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Uni : ed States, 431

u.s.

the operative
--------...__....._

(

to a seniority system imposed
.....
--------~~~---------·
VII.
1~ -.--..
...f j 1

, ,-1

k..

a f t~r

I rtc f, r-Jed

dA:...f.

.,t. he

.{:.

cA.-~

324

(1977),

date of Title

d..- ny-' ..-f+/..,_.-.~f-.t I J~
,.,.vteJ ti:,. d ~c ...e.:.5 ~ t-n .
l

~

. . ...

(

2.

FACTS:

In 1973, resp EEOC filed an employment
c=-;-

discrimination case charging that petrs' promotion and seniority
practices had confined blacks and women to low-paying jobs, in
violation of Title VII.

The case was consolidated with a private

Title VII class action case filed by resp Patterson.

In 1974,

the district court entered a declaratory judgment finding that
the employment practices violated Title VII.

Specifically, the

court found that until
1963 jobs at petrs' two plants were
____...,
overtly segregated on the basis of race and sex.

Covert

- -~

~-----------~

segregation continued well after the express segregation was
---------~
discontinued. In 1968, petrs instituted a posting and bidding
system whicn established six "lines of progression."

Each line

of progression required that an employee work in a lower level
job in that line before advancing to the next level job in the
same line.

The district court concluded that the "lines of

progression" perpetuated past discrimination and were not
justified as a business necessity.
On appeal, the CA4 affirmed the DC's findings, and with
minor modifications upheld the injunctive relief.
remanded for individual back pay proceedings.
certiorari, 429

The case was

This Court denied

u.s. 920 (1976).

While pending on remand, petrs moved to vacate the judgment
on the basis of the Court's decision in Teamsters; United States
Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431

u.s. 553 (1977); and Hazelwood

School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
(
'

The DC

denied the motion, finding that the seniority system was not a
~-~~-~-

bona fide system under Teamster s "because this system operated
'----- ~

~~

right up to the day of trial in a discriminatory manner . . .
~

[and] had a discriminatory genesis."
A panel of the CA4 affirmed, finding that the employment

-- -

.,

practice did not fall within the scope of §703(h) of Title VII,
which provides that:
"it shall not be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions or
privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
senio:r::_i ty system, . • . . provraea that such diffeienC:es are not the result of an intention to
discriminate because of race [or] sex."
The court remanded, however, for further findings with respect to
the bona fide nature of another practice challenged by resps,
namely the validity of a policy controlling interplant transfers
between petrs' two plants.
3.

DECISION BELOW:

v""

On rehearing en bane, a plurality of

------

the CA4 held
...__ that §703(h) had no applicability to the lines of

progression policy, even
.....

'------- _............._ __ , _..

.................

assuming it was a seniority system,

because the legislative history of the provision "conclusively
demonstrates that Congress intended the immunity accorded
seniority systems by §703(h) to run only to those systems in
existence at the time of Title VII's effective date, and . . . to

--

routine post-Act applications of such systems."

See Franks v.

-...__-~·_.......,.,...- . ~__....-...-------

Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976);

Team~ter~.

The

legislative history is "replete with indications that the
interests sought to be protected by this special exception to
Title VII's general coverage of all 'conditions of employment'
were those seniority rights already vested in incumbent workers
(

when Title VII went into effect."

The EEOC is of the view that

'

'

---------------- -q-

r

§703(h) has no applicability to seniority systems not in
operation at the effective date of Title VII.
(July 14, 1977).

EEOC Notice N-915

Moreover, a memo prepared by Senators Clark and

Case at the time of enactment stated that §703(h) was intended to
assure that Title VII had no effect on establi s hed seniority
rights.

110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964).

Accordingly, the district

court properly assessed the discriminatory effect of lines of
progression policy under Griggs v. Duke Powe r Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971).

l2.

The plurality then rached
other contentions not
.

presented before this Court, and ordered a remand on the question
whether petrs' inter-branch transfer rule violated Title VII.
Judge Winter, joined by Judge Butzner, concurred in the
result on the basis of the panel opinion.

Judge Winter disagreed

that a remand to consider the effects of Hazelwood School
District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), on the propriety
of the inter-branch transfer rule was required.
Judge Widener, joined by Judge Russell, dissented on the
ground that the record indicated that the lines of progression
policy were instituted before the effective date of the Act, and
thus the holding that §703(h) does not apply to post-Act
seniority systems is irrelevant.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

Pet r argues that the decision below is

inconsistent with numerous Supreme Court cases construing
§703(h).

Last Term, in California Brewers Association v.

Bry~nt,

444 U.S. 598 (1980), the Court held that the term "seniority

(

system" should be broadly construed in light of Title VII's
recognition of the long-standing labor policy recognizing the

"-- - ·

;

'

r~

importance of seniority systems.

The uncertainty concerning

post-Act seniority systems raised by the decision below should be
resolved.

The result below requires that post-Act seniority

systems meet the Griggs test, which is far harsher than the
purpose test required in Teamsters.

The difference in treatment

between post-Act and pre-Act seniority systems is illogical in
that otherwise bona fide seniority plans which discriminate only
in effect will be found to violate Title VII, if instituted after
1965, but not if created before.

This will work to the

disadvantage of blacks who may benefit from affirmative action
programs which will be suspect under the majority's strict
reading of §703(h).
Petr argues that the decision below is plainly inconsistent
with the express language of §703(h}, as well as being contrary
to its legislative history.

If Congress has meant to limit

S703(h) 's effect, it easily could have done so in plainer
language.

The legislative history relied on by the majority is

not persuasive of the effect of post-Act seniority systems.

The

decision below conflicts with the Court's construction of §703(h)
in Teamsters, Evans, and •rwA.

In TWA, the Court noted that

Griggs was not meant to apply to seniority systems, 432

u.s.

at

82-83 n. 13 ("absent a discriminatory purpose, the operation of a
seniority system cannot be an unlawful employment practice even
if the system has some discriminatory consequences").

Petrs also

allege that the decision below conflicts with Alexander v. Aero
Lodge, 565 F'.2d 1364 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436

(

(1978), and Hammeed v. Iron

Wor ! ~ers,

F.2d

u.s.

946

, 24 FEPC 352

v

(8th Cir. 1980), where the courts inquired whether seniority
systems were bona fide, and not whether they met Grigg's
requirements.

Petrs also cite a number of allegedly conflicting

district court cases.
Resp EEOC argues that cert should be denied given the
limited nature of petr's argument.

Under Federal Rule 60 (b) (5),

a district court has broad discretion to decide ·whether to reopen
a prior judgment to avoid extreme hardship or unfairness.

See,

u.s. 257, 263 n. 7 (1978).

Even

~._g.,

Browder v. Director, 434

assuming that §703(h) applies, petrs are not entitled to relief
under Rule 60 (b) (5), since bona fide requires that a system "not
have its genesis in racial discrimination [and that has been]
•"".

negotiated

. and maintained free from any illegal purpose."

Teamsters, 431

u.s. at 356.

Here, the record demonstrates that

the lines of progression had their origin in overt discriminatory
practices and were part of various policies designed to limit
blacks and women to lower paying jobs.

The DC properly concluded

that the lines of progression were not bona fide seniority
systems.
Moreover, the CA4 correctly held that §703(h) affords no
immunity to post-Act creation of the lines of progression, even
assuming that the practice was a seniority system.

On its face,

§703(h) neither defines bona fide nor purports to sanction postAct establishment of seniority 3ystems that unlawfully "operate
to 'freeze' the status quo of p r ior discriminatory practices."
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (1971).

The emphasis in Teamsters is on

(
vested rights accruing as the

. ,.

r ·~ sult

of existing seniority

-7-

systems, 431

{

u.s.

at 352 (§703(h) was a congressional compromise

designed to resolve "ambiguities concern[ing] Title VII's impact
on existing collectively bargaining seniority rights . . . [by]
allow[ing] for full exercise of seniority accumulated before the
effective date of the Act.").
Franks, 424

u.s.

at 759-761.

See· Evans, 431 U.S. 557-558;
No case cited by petr has squarely

presented the question whether §703(h) was meant to limit
judicial scrutiny of post-Act seniority systems, and thus no
conflict exists.
Resp workers argue that the decision below is not
inconsistent with prior Supreme Court precedent, since the case
law has expressly held that the purpose of §703(h) is to protect
pre-Act bona fide seniority systems, even if they act to

r ·

perpetuate pre-Act discrimination.

Without this provision, all

of these seniority systems would be invalid.

Clearly, this only

goes to protect pre-Act plans and, as the majority recognized,
any routine applications of those plans.

The logic of §703(h)

cannot be stretched to immunize totally new seniority plans from
normal scrutiny under Title VII.

None of the cases relied on by

petrs concern the same issue as presented here.

The decision

below is also supported by the alternative ground that the lines
of progression systems was not a seniority system.

The original

panel decision was based on that ground, and it was encompassed
in the opinion of Judge Butzner, joined in by Judge Winter.

The

three-judge majority also recog n ized that there was · considerable

(

support for this view, but determined not to reach the issue
given their resolution of the o t her point.

Finally, resps argue

-H-

.

that the case is not ripe for review in light of the extensive
remand ordered by the CA4 on back pay issues and other matters
relative to Teamsters with respect to other union practices.
5.

DISCUSSION:

I agree with the SG that review is

unwarranted in this case.

The allegedly inconsistent Supreme

Court cases are clearly distinguishable in that they have
uniformly considered pre-Act seniority systems.

---

-

Certainly the

distinction between pre-Act and post-Act actions is significant,

,.--________

--

and it is not at all illogical to suggest separate treatment for
seniority systems depending on when they were enacted.

The

entire thrust of Title VII is to make a rather bright line
distinction between events occurring before the effective date of
the Act, and those occurring after the date.

The majority's

decision effectuates that underlying philosophy.

Nothing in the

statutory language of §703(h) demands that the usual Griggs
analysis be discarded.

Bona fide does not inherently require

application of a purpose test, and the peculiar legislative
history does suggest that the primary focus of Congress was on
considering the effect of pre-Act seniority systems .
. In any event, this case is not a good factual vehicle for
considering the question since, as the SG points out, there is
ample evidence that the seniority system imposed was not bona
fide and was intentionally put into effect to continue petrs'
discriminatory practices.

Whil e the en bane court did not rely

on this logic, the DC did make this finding (as did . the original

(

panel), and the SG is not foreclosed from relying on the argument
under the Supreme Court Rules.

v'

Clearly, it would be better t o

-9-

consider the legal issue in a case where the proof of

(

discrimination had been ~ore clearly based on a disparate impact
Griggs analysis.
On balance, I would deny.
There are responses.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED srfl'1fE~ 1 ated: _..,__s_J::;...;:;,UN_l_SB_l
AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY
p ATTERSOX BT AL.

E'r AL.

v. JOHN

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE; UNITED S'I'A'l'ES COURT OF APPEALS FOH THE J<'OUH'I'H CIRCUIT

No. 80-1190. Deeided June -, 1981

with whom
join, dissenting.

JusTICE WHITE,
REHNQUIST

JusTICE PowELL

and

Jus'l'ICEJ

Section 703 (h) of Title VII, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (h) ,
provides that:
"NotwithstanJing any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not Q.t an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to apply different standaras of comJwnsatio~cnt terms. c"'OiiUitions. or privileges of employment pursuant to a bo.na fide seniority or merit
system . . . . 12roviderfthat such differencc7' a~he
;esult of an ~on to di~crimi1iatC' ' beeause of rac<:.,
color~ligion , sex, or nationalorigin, ... ."
A plurality of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
sitting en bane, has construed the prokctions affordedby ~ 703
(h) as not a )plying to any scniorit s stem institut,llil...after
the effective date o ritle
. The plurality based its holc!i 1g in par on its view that tl1C' legislative history of ~ 703 (h)
was "replete with indications'' which "conclusively demonstrates that Congress intended thC' immunity accorded seniority systRms by ~ 703 (h) to run ouly Lo those systems in
existence at the time of Title VlJ's effective date, and of
course to routine post-Act applications of such systems."
Accordingly, the plurality held that post-Act seuiority systems
should be assPssed ull(kr the test articulated in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. , 401 r. S. 424 (1971), and not under the more
relaxed standard announced in International Brotherhood of
T eamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977). for challenges to bona fide seniority systems adopted before the eft'ec-

1"'?~·

f~'ve-

AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. v. PATTERSON

tive date of Title VII. Since the particular seniority system
at question in this part of the case had already been found
to violate Griggs, the plurality held that a Title VII violation had been demonstrated with respect to the particular
seniority system at issue. 1
In my view, the Fourth Circuit has decided an important
question of federal law which this Court should review. First,
nothing in the language of § 703 (h) supports the bright-line
distmction ~bv the court beloW. On its face, § 703 (h)
d"'lfecls that bona fide~eniority svstems can only be found
to violate Title vn if they intentionallY discriminate on the
basis of race, sex, or o tner statutorily prohibited bases. There
is no indication in the text of the provision that Congress
intended bona fide seniority systems imposed after the effective date of Title VII to be treated in a fashion different from
pre-effertivc date systems.
It is also not clear that the Fourth Circuit's decision follows
directlv from the legislative history. The court below relied
nrimarily on various stl'!tements from the legislative history
indirating that Title VII was 11ot intended to undermine
"established" or "existing" seniority rights. See 110 Cong.
Rer. 7213 (1964) (memorandum of Se11. Clark and Sen.
Case): id., at 7207 (Justice Dep3rtment comments). The
Fonrt!) Circuit was correct that Title VII in general. and
~ 703 (h) in particular, evidence a com~ern that sellinrity
rie:hts alrPRdv vestrd at the time of the effective date of Title
VII shonlcl be probcted. But it does not necessarilv follow
from this observation that § 703 (h) was not intended to prot Thr origimd panel fouud that the ~rniorit~· sv~tew in que~tion was
not "bona fide'' within thr mPaning of§ io::l (h). Sre Patterso11 \' . Arne?·ican Tobacco Co .. 586 F. 2d 300, 303 (CA4 1978). The ]Jiurality did not
rr]y on thi~ gronnd. however , but instead based ih deci::;ion on the llOn:1l)j)]irabilitY of ~ 703 (h) to ::;enioritY ::;y:;tem~ (•JJactecl after the effective
dnt<> of Titl<> YII. Similarly, tlH• Fourth Circuit specifically refused to
bn~r its deri::;ion on respondents' argumpnt that thr specific sy~t em under
rrn~iclrration was T'OI in fnd a seniority ~y~tPm within the meaning of
§703 (h). 634 F. 2d, ut 749, n. 3.

AMERI<::AN TOBAeeo CO. v. PATTERSON
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teet subsequently-imposed senioirty systems. Reading such
negative implications into the legislative history is a specula~
tive enterprise given the lack of any limiting language in the
statute itself. As presently advised, I am not prepared to
say that the legislative history constitutes a "clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary" of the statute's
otherwise clear language. See Consumer Products Safety
Commission v. GTE Sylva.nia, Inc., 447 lT. S. 102. 108 (1980).
Nor is the reading given ~ 703 (h b the Court of Appeals
obviously consistent wit t e Court's prior constructions of
that Section . . IlVTea~ the Court stated that "the
unmistakable purpose of § 703 (h) was to make clear that the
routine application of a bona fide seniority system would not
be unlawful under Title VII." 431 U. S .. at 352. See Trans
·world Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 82 (1977)
( § 703 (JifProviaes th at rrab;e;;t a discriminatory purpose,
the operation of a seniority system cannot be an unlawful
employment practice even if the system has some discriminatory consequences"). The Court has also noted that Title
VII was passed "against the backdrop of this Nation's longstanding labor policy of leaving to the chosen representatives
of employers and employees the freedom through collective
bargaining to establish conditions of employment applicable
to a particular business or industrial environment." CalifonLia Brewers Association v. Bryant, 444 U. S. 598, 608
(Hl80). While none of these cases considered the exact
question at issue in this case, and thus do not necessarily
require a result contrary to the decision below, it is equally
true that the Court has never suggested that the effective
date of Title VII makes any difference in terms of the applicability of § 703 (h).
Finally, while the F~rth Cj~uit's decision is in accord with
the present position of the Equal Employment Opportunity
in conflict
with decisions of other ~rts
Commision, 2 it is
.
._.
~

2 Sec EEOC Notice, No. N-915 (July 14, 1977) (EEOC'E po:,;ition is
that "a Heniority Ry:stern iK protected under Scetion 703 (h) only if it was
in~tituted prior to the effective date of Title VII").

4
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o~als

that hav,e routinely applied Teamsters to post-Act
imposition or revisiou
"'semonty systems. ~e. g.,
Alexander v. Aero Lodge No. 73 , 565 . 2c 1364 (QA6)1977),
cert. denied, 436 U. S. 946 (1978); Hameed v. International
Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron
Workers, 637 F. 2d 506, 516 (CA8 80).
Given the above concerns an the obvious importance of
the issue presented with respect to the validity of all recently
adopted seniority systems, an issue which will necessarily reeur time and again, I would issue the writ of certiorari.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

January 16, 1982

Mary

No. 80-1199, The American Tobacco Co., Tobacco Workers' Int'l Union,

& Local 182 of Tobacco workers' Int'l Union
v. John Patterson, et al.

Question Presented

Does §703(h) protect bona fide post-Civil Rights Act
seniority plans, or does it only apply to

~e-Act

plans?

~.:.,

'

·.
'
"

2.
I.

BACKGROUND
19~,

In

bidding system,

petrs instituted (or modified) a posting and
which resulted in the six "lines of progression"

now at issue in this case (three other lines of progression are not
challenged here).

Each line of progression required that an

employee work in a lower level job in that line before advancing to
the next level job in the same line.
In 1973, resp EEOC filed an employment discrimination
case challenging petrs' promotion and seniority practices on the
ground that they e onfined blacks and women to low-paying jobs,
-K-

i~violation

of Title VII.

The case was consolidated with a private

Title VII class action filed by resp Patterson on the basis of
administrative charges filed in 1969.
In 1974, the DC entered a declaratory judgment, finding

)r~

'I

that six lines of progression and certain other employment practices
violated Title VII.

Specifically, the court found that until 1963,

~

jobs at petrs' two plants wre overtly segregated on the basis of
race and sex and that covert segregation continued well after the
express segregation was discontinued.

The DC concluded that the

"lines of progression" perpetuated past discrimination and were not
justified by busness necessity.

~ r~ was

At the time of these findings, the

that Title VII invalidated seniority systems that

-

perpetuate the effects of pre-Act discrimination regardless of
motivation.

On appeal, the CA4 affirmed the DC's findings, and, with <?~~

----

minor modifications, upheld the injunctive relief.
remanded for individual back pay proceedings.

~· ..."~··

...<,

•

The case was

This Court denied

4ii
~ n
-~rr~

3.

u.s.

cert, 429

920 (1976).

While pending on remand, the Court handed down
-----------~

International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.

u.s.,

431 U.S. 324 (1977).

There, the Court held that §703(h) protects plans that perpetuate

---

past discrimination provided they are not motivated by
The company and union moved for relief from

discriminator

the DC in light of Teamsters, United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431

u.s.

553 (1977), and Hazelwood School District v. U.S., 433 U.S. 299

(1977).

The DC denied the motion on the merits, holding that the

challenged system was not a bona fide plan under Teamsters because
it "had a discriminatory genesis" and operated right up to the day
of trial in a discriminatory manner.

J.A. 110.

The CA upheld the DC's findings with respect to the lines
of progression at issue before this Court, but remanded on another
issue, holding that more fact findings were needed regarding the
bona fides of the use of length of time of branch service to measure

progression were not bona fide; instead, it held that they were not

----

part of a seniority system; §703(h) was, therefore, inapplicable,
I

·'

and the DC had applied the proper legal standard (disparate impact)
in considering them.
The company and the union filed petns for rehearing en
bane.

While these petns were

Bryant, 444

u.s.

pending,~alifornia

598 (1980) came down.

Brewers Ass'n v.

That case gave a broader

reading to the term "seniority system" than that applied by the

-

panel.
En bane, the CA4 1 ruled that §703(h) had no applicability

----

------------------------------~

Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages.

~/J¥ ~ 'Jl>->t:t)

~· k~
to the lines of progression, even

/'2..+1A-u... ~~~

assumi~g 'ffia1- 1t

4.

~~~ ~ ~

vi/

was a seniority

VI~

system, because the legislative history of the provision
"conclusively demonstrates that Congress intended the

immunit~

accorded seniority systems by §703(f) to run only to those systems
in existence at the time of Title VII's effective date, and ••. to
routine post-Act applications of such systems."

The CA4 found the

legislative history "replete with indications that the interests
sought to be

prot~cted

by this special exception to Title VII's

general coverage of all 'conditions of employment' were those
seniority rights already vested in incumbent workers when Title VII
went into effect."
v/Judge Widener, joined by Judge Russell, dissented.

Judge

Widener doubted that the majority's holding was correct in limiting
§703(h) protection to pre-Act seniority systems.

~

He noted that

"§703(h) on its face immunizes all bona fide seniority systems" and
( that §703(h) is not written like a grandfather clause, though
Congress undoubtedly knows how to write such clauses when it wishes.
J.A. 160 n.l.

Judge Widener focused, not on this point, but on the

adequacy of the record supporting the majority's finding that the
lines of progression were adopted in 1968.

He noted that the DC had

made no findings on the point and that the record evidence indicated
that a much larger number of lines of progression (including these
6) had existed in practice prior to the Act, though not expressly

1 (Haynesworth, Winter, Butzner, Russell, Widener, Hall &
Phillips) (Widener & Butzner dissenting from the majority's
construction of §703(h).

·.

5.

defined in the collective bargaining agreement.

In 1968, the

parties substantially reduced the number of lines of progression,
these 6 being among the 9 that survived.

If these facts, all

supported by record evidence of some kind, were true, he observed
that the 1968 "change" only benefited black employees by reducing

-

the number of jobs covered by the resrtictive lines of progression.
He considered a remand necessary so that the DC could make initial
. d.1ngs on th ese po1n
. t s. 2
f 1n
The en bane CA remanded for a hearing on, among other
things, the bona fides of the rule that seniority was forfeited when
an employee transferred between branches or divisions.

These issues

are not before the Court; cert was granted only on whether §703(h}1
applies to pre-Act, not post-Act, seniority plans. 3

II.
A.

DISCUSSION
The Statute
Section 703(h) provides:

"Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
2The majority merely stated that the record contained
enough evidence to support the conclusion that substantial
changes or "formalizations" were made in 1968 "(whether in favor
of or against employee interests) to consititute s new policy, or
at least one so radically altered from prior unstructured
procedures that it could not be considered simply a 'routine
application,' ••• of those 1965 procedures." J.A. 143, n.4
(citing Teamsters).
3No other circuit has distinguished between pre-Act and
post-Act plans in considering whether a plan violates Title VII.
See cases collected in brief of Amer. Tobacco (blue) n.32, at 25 •

...

~·

6.

employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production or to employees who work in different
locations, prpvided that such differences are not the
result of an q n t ention to discriminat ~ because of race,
color, relig1on, sex, or national origin • . . •
By its clear terms, the provision makes no discriminations in terms
of time--it would seem to apply equally to all seniority plans,
whether pre-Act or post-Act.

B.

Evidence Supporting the CA4

"'
The CA4 does not mention the 1 l anguage of the statute.

~?I
~) CA4's

~ one

The

analysis of whether §703(h} covers post-Act plans consists of

2-sentence paragraph in text and one footnote.

cert at app. 9-10 & n.S at app. 10.

See petn for

In text, the Court states that

the legislative history examined by this Court in Teamsters and
Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747 (1976}, "conclusively demonstrates
that Congress intended the immunity [of §703(h}] to run only to
those systems in existence at the time of Title VII's effective
date, and of course to routine post-Act applications of such
systems."

Petn app. 10.

In support, t:J.ecA cites Teamsters, 431

U.S., at 352, where the Court noted that §703(h} was designed to
clarify that the Act "would not outlaw such differences in treatment
among employees as flowed from a bona fide seniority system that
allowed for full exercise of

se~iority

accumulated before the

effective date of the Act."
The CA4's textual discussion ends with the statement that
the legislative history is "replete" with evidence that §703(h} was
to protect seniority rights already vested at the time the Act

7.

became effect.

A footnote supports this second assertion.

theCA relies on:

Here,

(1) EEOC's position that §703(h) has no

application to post-Act seniority systems (a position partially
abandoned in the brief to this Court);

(2) a memorandum prepared by

Senators Clark and Case explaining that Tile VII would have no
effect on established seniority rights;

(3) a Justice Department

statement that Title VII would have no effect on seniorty rights in
existence on its effective date;

u.s.,

(4) a statement in Teamsters, 431

at 352, to the effect that Title VII would allow "full

exercise of seniority accumulated before the effective date of the
Act" (already cited in text after the first sentence); and (5) the
fact that Title VII is a broad remedial statute.
The sole support for the CA4's position, aside from the
remedial nature of Title VII, 4 is the EEOC's position (now partially

-

abandoned) , the negative pregnant present in the assertion that
Title VII andjor §703(h) would not interfere with seniority rights
vested as of the Act's effective date (con~ ined in 3 statements,
one from Justice, one from an explanation prepared by two senators,
and one in Teamsters).

4The remedial-nature argument is no more than a statement
of preference for Title VII pltfs over Title VII defts. If such
a preference determines the scope of provisions Congress inserted
to limit Title VII's impact, those limits will be eroded, if not
eliminated. Because §703(h) is a provision limiting the scope of
Title VII, Title VII's remedial nature should not be the
overriding principle guiding its construction.

8.
C.

The Evidence Opposing the CA4
As Justice White pointed out in his dissent from denial in

this case, which you joined, the evidence opposing the CA4's
position is considerable.

(Justices Stewart and Rehnquist also

eventually voted to grant).

1.

Evidence in the legislative history.

The union's brief

(blue) 12-31 does an excellent job of marshalling the legislative

~S

~

:::::::si:n::p:s::::: ::m:::Yc::·:h~:::~:n:m:::tt::se::::::: ~
~~~

discussed in that brief.

First, there is not one statement in all of Title VII's
history stating that §703(h) does not protect post-Act plans.
"Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,"
the language of a statute "must ordinarily be regarded as
•

conclusive."

u.s.

1)

Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447

102, 108 (1980).
Many statements not reported by the CA4 are inconsistent

with its interpretation.

For example, Senator Clark's intorductory

remarks to the Clark-Case explanation include the statement that
"the bill would not affect seniority at all."

110 Cong. Rec. 7207.

Moreover, the discussion of "pre-Act" seniority systems was
initiated by the bill's opponents prior to the addition of §703(h);
dUring this pre-§703(h) period, they argued that Title VII would
destroy even existing seniority rights.

In contrast, the bill's

proponents repeatedly focused their assurances on the fact that
Title VII would not affect seniority plans.

This aspect of the

9.

history is discussed in the union's brief (blue) at 14-23. 5
The House passed the bill without §703(h), and it was
introduced to the Senate in that form.

After the speeches in

support were completed, a filibuster began.
the Dirksen-Mansfield substitute was
included §703(h).

To end the filibuster,

introduced~

its amendments

In making the major presentation of these

changes, Senator Humphrey explained that §703(h) was not a
substantive change, but only a clarification. 110 Cong. Rec. 12732.
As noted in Amer. Tobacco's brief, Senator Dirksen thought
that the amendment was probably the most meticulously drafted piece
of legislation he had ever worked on, adding "We have tried to be
mindful of every word, of every comma, and of the shading of every
phrase."

110 Cong. Rec. 11935.

And Senator Dirksen's statements in J

reference to seniority plans indicate that §703(h) protects all bona
'------"'

fide plans.

See, e.g., id., 14331 ("Senate amendments permit and

protect seniority, merit, and all incentive systems.").

It cannot

be doubted that Senator Dirksen knew how to draft a grandfather
5see, e.g., 119 Cong. Rec. 1518 (statement of
Representative Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
in presenting the bill on the House floor) ("It has been asserted
also that the bill would destroy worker seniority systems and
employee rights vis-a-vis the union and the employer. This again
is wrong.")~ id., at 6566 (memorandum prepared by Rebublican
sponsors in the-House describing bill as it passed the House)
("Title VII ••• does not permit interferences with seniority
rights of employees or union members.")~ id., at 5094 (during
debate on whether bill should be referred to Committee, Senator
Humphrey, co-manager, introduced newspaper article quoting the
answers of a Justice Department "expert" to the "ten most common
objections.") ("What is prohibited is the refusal to hire someone
because of his race or religion. Similarly, the law will have no
effect on union seniority rights."). For additional statements
of Senator Humphrey, see brief of union (blue) at 16-17, 22-23.

10.
clause--and the conclusion that §703(h) means what it says seems
inescapable.
Moreover, as the union's brief (blue) notes at 28, Congress
intended Title VII to be a "spur or catalyst" to broadening
employment opportunities for minorities.

Yet, if §703(h) is a

grandfather clause protecting only pre-Act plans not changed or
modified since the Act, it will operate (as the decision below

~

illustrates) as a disincentive to broaden (or change in any way) ~
seniority plans, even in order to ameliorate their effect on
'---·---

minorities.

2. Title VII and labor policy.

This Court has recognized

that Title VII in general, and §703(h) in particular, must be
construed with the knowledge that Congress did not intend Title VII
to intrude unnecessarily upon national labor policy:
.. lies at the core of our
o
, and seniority provisions are
included in these contracts. Without a clear
and express indication from Congress, we cannot agree ...
that an agreed-upon seniority system must give way ••. "
TWA v. Hardison, 432 u.s. 63, 79 (1981).
And in California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444

u.s.

598, 606 (1980),

the Court stated:
"Congess passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the
backdrop of this Nation's longstanding labo5_policy of
leaving to the chosen representatives of empoyers and
employees the freedom through collective bargaining to
establish conditions of employment applicable to a
particular business or industrial environment. See
generally Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 u.s. 193. It does
not behoove a court to second guess either that process or
its products •.... Seniority systems, reflecting as they
do, not only the give and take of free colletive
bargaining, but also the specific characteristics of a
particular business or industry, inevitably come in all
sizes and shapes ..•.• As we made clear in the Teamsters

11.
case, seniority may be "measured in a number of ways" and
the legislative history fo §703(h) does not suggest that
it was enacted to prefer any particular variety of
senioriy system over any other." (citations omitted).

2.

Evidence in the prior decisions of this Court

construing §703(h).

Although the CA4 found one "negative pregnant"

in Teamsters, the decision below is consistent with neither
Teamsters nor the other decisions of this Court construing §703(h).
Although these cases did not directly address whether §703(h) is
only a grandfather clause, their discussions suggest that §703 is
generally applicable regardless of the date on which a plan
originated.
In Teamsters, the Court stated that Congress intend to
protect many kinds of seniority plans, noting that "[t]hen, as now,
seniority was measured in a number of ways."

In ~ ted

431 U.S., at 355 n.41.

Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977), the

Court upheld a seniority system that perpetuated the effect of postAct discriminaton.

The Court rejected the "narrow" construction of

§703(h) adopted by theCA:
"This reading of §703(h) is too narrow. The statute does
not foreclose attacks on the current operation of
seniority systems which are subject to challenge as
discriminatory, But such a challenge to a neutral system
may not be predicated on the mere fact that a past event
which has no present legal significance has affected the
calculation of seniority credit, even if the past event
might at one time have jusitified a valid claim against
the employer." Id., at 560.
In Evans, the Court also noted that "§703(h) unequivocally mandates
that there is no statutory violation in the absence of a showing of
discriminatory purpose."

Id., at 559-560.

And in TWA v. Hardison, 432

.•

u.s.

63 (1977), the Court

12.

emphasized, without differentiating between pre-Act and post-Act
practices, that "seniority systems are afforded special treatment
under Title VII itself.

D. The SG's

Id., at 81.

Position ~ ~

I

~~~~'

The SG urges a novel and rather strange interpretation of
§703(h).

Section 703(h) states that it is not unlawful

(notwithstanding any other provision of Title VII) for an employer
"to apply different standards of compensation," etc., "pursuant to a
bona fide seniority plan."

And §703(a) (2) makes it illegal for an

employer "to limit .•• or classify his employees

in any way

which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employement
opportunities or otherwise adverselly affect his status as an
employee because of such individual's race."

The SG concludes that

§703(h) only "immunizes" 6 application of a bona fide plan, but an
employer's adoption of such a plan is not "immunized" by §703(h) if
the plan has an adverse impact on minorities--and it is therefore
illegal under §703 (a) (2).
Thus, in the case at bar, presuming the challenged plan was
bona fide but had a discriminatory impact, it was illegal for the
employer to agree to the lines of progression in 1968, but it was

6The use of the word "immunize" to refer to the effect of
§703(h) on plans under it is not entirely appropriate. Section
703(h) does not immunize plans--it provides that plans that are
bona fide and that are not intended to discriminate do not
violate Title VII. A plan is not, however, "immune" if it is
adopted to discriminate. Thus, construing §703(h) as applying to
post-Act as well as pre-Act plans will not "immunize"
intentionally-discriminatory plans.

,..,.'.· .'

.; ~

.·

13.
not illegal to make employment decisions pursuant to that plan
thereafter.
There are several problems with this approach.

A threshold

problem is that the SG urges affirmance of the court below in the
absence of any finding of a timely charge under the SG's theory.
Under that theory, a seniority plan is "immunized" by §703(h) once
it is adopted and the relevant period for filing a timely charge
passes without any charge being filed.

The SG apparently concedes

that the EEOC's charge and the sex-discrimination charge are timebar red.

See reply brief of Amer. Tobacco (yellow) at 13-14.

relevant limit for filing charges was then 90 days.)

(The

The charges

underlying the Patterson class action (for racial discrimination)
were filed in Jan. and Feb. of 1969.

Id.

The SG's timeliness

argument is made in n.6 at 5 of the SG's brief.

There, the SG notes

that the challenged "'lines of progression ••• were finally set up
at a meeting in November 1968 •.• '"
statement of Mr. Truitt).

(quoting trial transcript,

The only relevant finding by a lower

court, however, is theCA's:

"This policy was not in effect ••. in

1965 when Title VII went into effect, but was only adopted in
January 1968 •.•. "

Petn app. 9.

If the lines of progression were

adopted Jan., 1968, rather than Nov., 1968, then the Patterson
charges (filed in Jan. & Feb., 1969) were untimely (more than 90
days).

Even if the Court were to adopt the SG's theory, it would

have to vacate or remand on the timeliness question.
There are less-technical
be
rejected.
.1'<
---.

reason~

SGs' approach should

First, the legislative history, discussed above,

indicates that Congress meant to clarify Title VII (not implement a

• >

14.

substantive change) when it adopted §703(h).

The clarification was

to show that Title VII would not interfere with bona fide seniority
plans.

Yet the SG asserts that Congress only meant to protect bona

fide plans from charges filed more than 90 days (now 180 days) after
the plan's adoption.
Second, the SG's reading of the statutory language is
strained; it rests on a negative pregnant found
cauctionary language of §703(h).

withi~the

purely

Section 703(h) provides that

(notwithstanding other provisions) certain employment actions
(pursuant to bona fide plans) are legal; it does not proscribe any
conduct nor does it purport to provide an exhaustive list of the
kinds of employment actions that are legal under Title VII.

Thus,

the fact that an action pursuant to a bona fide plan is expressly
stated to be legal does not, in the context of a clarifying proviso
such as §703(h), mean that the adoption of the plan is illegal.

If

anything, it suggests that such the adoption of such a plan is not
be the type of "clasification" or "limitation" §703(a) (2) was
designed to proscribe.

In this context, it should be noted that the

words used in §703(h) to describe seniority plans are quite
different from the words used to describe the conduct prohibited by
§703(a) (2). 7
7 section 703(a) (2) makes it illegal to "limit, segregate,
or classify ..• employees in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin."
Section 703(h) provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of
Footnote continued on next page.

•"

....

15.

Third, the SG turns §703{h) into what is essentially a
special statute of limitations for seniority plans.

Yet Congress

did not use wording in any way similar to the other provisions of
Title VII dealing with time limits.
Finally, if the SG is right, and the adoption of seniority
plans by employers are proscribed by §703{a) {2) because that act is
not expressly included within §703{h), then the adoption of §703{h)
was not a clarification but a major substantive change from what
Congress had previously intended, and the proponents of the Act were
repeatedly dishonest in asserting, both before and after the
addition of §703{h), that Title VII would not interfere with
seniority systems under collective bargaining agreements.
On balance, it is most unlikely that Congress meant
§703{a) {2) to outlaw the adoption of the kinds of things regarded as
seniority plans under §703{h).

CONCLUSION
In reaching the decision below, the CA4 relied heavily on a
negative pregnant in three statements {one in an explanation
prepared by two senators, one in a memorandum prepared by Justice,
and one in Teamsters), to the effect that Title VII was not intended
to destroy seniority rights already vested at the time of its

emloyment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production or to employees who work in different locations,
provided that such differences are not the result of an intention
to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin •••• "

16.

enactment.

But nowhere in the legislative history is there support

for concluding that the Congress meant to limit the protection of
§703(h) to seniority plans then in effect--indeed, the legislative
history provides overwhelming support for the proposition that
§703(h) means what it says and applies to all seniority plans,
regardless of date of adoption.

The decisions of this Court

discussing §703(h) and the decisions of other courts also support
the plain language of the statute.
The CA4's decision was supported by the EEOC's position,
but that position
has now ________
been abandoned.
-----------___;;o.----..
_

~

The SG maintains that

§703(h) protects only actions taken pursuant to bona fide plans, but
that an employer's adoption of such plans is not protected by
§703(h) and is prohibited by §703(a) (2).

Section ~ 5,G~7

therefore, simply a statute of limitations
plan is not filed within 90 days of its adoption, the
protected by §703(h).

If Congress intented to create a special

statute of limitations when it enacted §703(h), it certainly
/1

- ,,

in an unusually oblique way.

Moreover, this

construction is neither demanded by the statutory language (§703(h)
proscribes nothing and is not an exhaustive list of legal employment
proctices) nor consistent with the legislative history, which
reveals that the supporters of Title VII repeatedly assured
opponents, both before and after the adoption of §703(h), that Title
VII would not interfere with seniority rights.
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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1199
AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. JOHN PATTERSON, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE, FOURTH CIRCUIT
[February - , 1982]

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Under Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U. S. 424 (1971), a
prima facie violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 78 Stat. 257, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(h), "may be established by policies or practices that are neutral on their face
and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in effect
against a particular group." Teamsters v. United States,
431 U. S. 324, 349 (1977). A seniority system "would seem
to fall under the Griggs rationale" if it were not for § 703(h) of
the Civil Rights Act. Ibid. That section provides in pertinent part:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, . . . provided that such differences are not the
result of an intention to discriminate because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to give
and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended

a_;~-

~
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or used to discriminate because race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin .... "
Under § 703(h), the fact that a seniority system has a discriminatory impact is not alone sufficient to invalidate the
system; actual intent to discriminate must be proved. The
Court of Appeals in this case, however, held that § 703(h)
does not apply to seniority systems adopted after the effective date of the Civil Rights Act. 1 We granted the petition
for certiorari to address the validity of this construction of
the section. - - U. S. - - .
I
Petitioner American Tobacco Company operates two
plants in Richmond, Virginia, one which manufactures cigarettes and one which manufactures pipe tobacco. Each plant
is divided into a prefabrication department, which blends and
prepares tobacco for further processing, and a fabrication department, which manufactures the final product. Petitioner
Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers' International
Union and its affiliate Local 182 are the exclusive collective
bargaining agents for hourly-paid production workers at both
plants.
It is uncontested that prior to 1963 the company and the
union engaged in overt race discrimination. The union maintained two segregated locals, and black employees were assigned to jobs in the lower paying prefabrication departments. Higher paying jobs in the fabrication departments
were largely reserved for white employees. An employee
could transfer from one of the predominately black prefabrication departments to one of the predominately white fabrication departments only by forfeiting his seniority.
In 1963, under pressure from government procurement
agencies enforcing the antidiscrimination obligations of government contractors, the company abolished departmental
'Title VII became effective July 2, 1965, one year after its enactment.

80--1199---0PINION
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seniority in favor of plant-wide seniority and the black union
local was merged into the white local. However, promotions
were no longer based solely on seniority but rather on seniority plus certain qualifications, and employees lost accumulated seniority in the event of a transfer between plants.
Between 1963 and 1968, when this promotions policy was in
force, virtually all vacancies in the fabrication departments
were filled by white employees due to the discretion vested in
supervisors to determine wl}p- was qualified.
In November 1968 the 'Company proposed the establishment of 9 linys- of progression, 6 of which are at issue in this
case. The union accepted and ratified the lines of progression in 1969. Each line of progression consisted of two jobs;
an employee was not eligible for the top job in the line until
he had worked in the bottom job. Four of the six lines of
progression at issue here consisted of nearly all-white top
jobs from the fabrication departments linked with nearly allwhite bottom jobs from the fabrication departments; the
other two consisted of all-black top jobs from the prefabrication departments linked with all-black bottom jobs from the
prefabrication departments. The top jobs in the white lines
of progression were among the best-paying jobs in the plants.
On January 3, 1969 respondent Patterson and two other
black employees filed charges with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission alleging that petitioners had discriminated against them on the basis of race. The EEOC
found reasonable cause to believe that petitioners' seniority,
wage, and job classification practices violated Title VII.
After conciliation efforts failed, the employees filed a class
action in District Court in 1973 charging petitioners with racial discrimination in violation of Title VII and 42 U. S. C.
§ 1981. Their suit was consolidated for trial with a subsequent Title VII action filed by the EEOC alleging both race
and sex discrimination. Following trial, the District Court
held that petitioners' seniority, promotion, and job classification practices violated Title VII. The court found that 6 of

80-1199-0PINION
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the 9 lines of progression were not justified by business necessity and "perpetuted past discrimination on the basis of
sex and race." App. 32. The court enjoined the company
and the union from further use of lines of progression. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed and remanded for further proceedings with respect to remedy, 535
F. 2d 257 (1976), and we denied a petition for certiorari. 429
u. s. 920 (1976).
On remand petitioners moved to vacate the District
Court's 1974 orders and to dismiss the complaints on the
basis of this Court's decision in Teamsters v. United States,
supra, which held that § 703(h) insulates bona fide seniority
systems from attack even though they may have discriminatory impact on minorities. The District Court denied the
motions, holding that petitioners' seniority system "is not a
bona fide system under Teamsters ... because it operated
right up to the day of trial in a discriminatory manner."
App. 110. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals agreed
that "Teamsters requires no modification of the relief we approved with regard to . . . lines of progression," because they
were not part of a seniority system within the meaning of
§ 703(h). 568 F. 2d 300, 303 (1978).
The Court of Appeals reheard the case en bane. It did not
decide whether the lines of progression were part of a seniority system. Instead, it held that even if the lines of progression were considered -arto f a semon y sy~ess
intenaea--tlie Immunity accor e semority systems y
§ 703'(ll)t'6f'!:llf0l11Yto t ose sys ems m existence at the time
of Title VI s ef ec Ive ate, an o c
e o rou me post-Act
appl~ems." 634 F. 2d 744, 749 (1980). 2
We reverse.
' The en bane court remanded the case to the District Court for additional proceedings to determine whether the plantwide seniority system in
effect since 1963 is a bona fide seniority system within the contemplation of
§ 703(h). See 634 F. 2d 744, 750. This issue is not before the Court.

I
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II

Petitioners argue that the plain language of § 703(h) applies
to post-Act as well as pre-Act seniority systems. The respondent employees claim that the provision "provides a narrow exemption [from the ordinary discriminatory impact
test] which was specifically designed to protect bona fide seniority systems which were in existence before the effective
date of Title VII." Brief for Respondents Patterson, et al.
29. ResEon?e~E{~ supports the judgment below, but
urges us to mterpre
03(h) so as to protect the post-Act
application of a bona fide seniority system but not the postAct adoption of a seniority system or an aspect of a seniority
system.
As in all cases involving statutory construction, "our starting point must be the language employed by Congress,"
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U. S. 330, 337 (1979), and we
assume "that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used." Richards v. United
States, 369 U. S. 1, 9 (1962). Thus "[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, the language
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive." Consumer
Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447
U. S. 102, 108 (1980). The plain language of§ 703(h) is particularly cogent in light of the circumstances of its drafting.
It was part of the Dirksen-Mansfield compromise substitute
bill which represented "not merely weeks, but months of
labor." 110 Cong. Rec. 11935 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen). As Senator Dirksen explained, "I doubt very much
whether in my whole legislative lifetime any measure has received so much meticulous attention. We have tried to be
mindful of every word, of every comma, and of the shading of
every phrase." Ibid.
On its face § 703(h). makes no distinction between pre- and
post-Act seniority systems, just as it does not distinguish between pre- and post-Act merit systems or pre- and post-Act

80-1199-0PINION
6

AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. v. PATTERSON

The section employs the ~sent tense and the )
i. e. "shall not be" and "to apply,' w 1c indicates that it applies prospectively. It does not take the form
of a savings clause or a grandfather clause designed to exclude existing practices from the operation of a new rule.
Other sections of Title VII enacted by the same Congress
contain grandfather clauses, see § 703(b), 78 Stat. 253 (1964),
42 U. S. C. § 2000e-(e), which increases our reluctance to
transform a provision that we have previously described as
"defining what is and is not an illegal discriminatory practice,'' Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U. S. 747,
761 (1976), from a definitional clause into a grandfather
clause.
The EEOC's position receives little support from the statutory language permitting an employer to "apply" different
standards of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or
merit system. The application of different standards must,
by the terms of the statute, be pursuant to a seniority or
merit system; the system and its application are thus inextricably interwoven. Furthermore, it makes little sense to
distinguish adoption from application ~itle
VII c allenge to a semont system.
he adoption of a seniOrity system w 1ch as not een "applied" or put into operation would not give rise to a cause of action, for it would result in discrimination only if it were to be put into operation
or if that event were sufficiently likely, in which case it would
be odd not to judge the matter based on the validity of the
factor that creates the cause of action, i. e., the application of
the system. An adequate remedy for adopting a discriminatory seniority system would very likely include an injunction
against the future application of the system and backpay
awards for those harmed by its application. However, such
an injunction would lie only if the requirements of § 703(h)that such application be intentionally discriminatory-were
satisfied.
Under the EEOC's interpretation of the statute, plaintiffs
who file a timely challenge to the adoption of a seniority sys-

ability tests.

~nse,
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tern arguably would prevail in a Title VII action if they could
prove that the system would have a discriminatory impact
even if it was not purposefully discriminatory. See Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., supra. On the other hand, employees who
seek redress under Title VII more than 180 3 days after the
adoption of a seniority system-for example, all persons
whose employment begins more than 180 days after an employer adopts a seniority system-would have to prove the
system was intentionally discriminatory. 4 Yet employees
who prevailed by showing that a bona fide seniority system
had a discriminatory impact although not adopted with discriminatory intent would not be entitled to an injunction forbidding the application of system: § 703(h) plainly allows the
application of such a seniority system.
A further result of the EEOC's theory would be to discourage unions and employers from modifying pre-Act seniority
systems or post-Act systems whose adoption was not timely
challenged. Any modification, if timely challenged, would
be subject to the Griggs standard-even if it benefited persons covered by Title VII-thereby creating an incentive to
retain existing systems which enjoy the protection of
§ 703(h). 5
3
Prior to 1972, Title VII generally required charges to be filed within 90
days of an alleged discriminatory practice. Section 706(e), 78 Stat. 260,
was added in 1972. It now requires aggrieved persons to file a charge
"within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-5(e).
• The facts of this case give rise to just such an anomaly under the
EEOC theory. The respondent employees filed race discrimination
charges within 90 days of the adoption of the lines of progression but sex
discrimination charges were filed more than 90 days after the adoption.
Under the EEOC theory, the lines of progresion would be analyzed under
two different tests: the Griggs impact test and the § 703(h) intentional
discrimination test.
5
"Significant freedom must be afforded employers and unions to create
differing seniority systems." California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444
U. S. 598, 608 (1980). Petitioners' interpretation of § 703(h) would impinge on that freedom by discouraging modification of existing seniority

(
~
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Statutes should be interpreted to avoid untenable distinctions and unreasonable results whenever possible. The
EEOC's reading of § 703(h) would make it illegal to adopt,
and in practice to apply, seniority systems that fall within the
class of systems protected by the provision. We must,
therefore, reject such a reading.
III
Although the plain language of § 703(h) makes no distinction between pre-Act and post-Act seniority systems, the
court below found support for its distinction between the two
in the legislative history. Such an intepretation misreads
the legislative history.
We have not been informed of and have not found a single
statement anywhere in the legislative history saying that
§ 703(h) does not protect seniority systems adopted or modified after the effective date of Title VII. Nor does the legislative history reveal that Congress intended to distinguish
between adoption and application of a bona fide seniority system. The most which can be said for the legislative history
of § 703(h) is that it is inconclusive with respect to the issue
presented in this case.
As we have previously described, see Franks v. Bowman
Transportation Co., supra, at 759-761, the initial bill 6
passed by the House of Representatives on February 10,
1964 did not contain § 703(h) and neither the bill nor the majority Judiciary Committee Report 7 even mentioned seniority. However, the House Minority Report warned that the
bill, if enacted, would destroy seniority. H. Rep. No. 914,
88th Gong. 1st Sess. 64-65 (1963). Following a 17-day debate over whether the bill should be referred to committee,
the Senate voted to reject the motion to refer it to committee
systems or adoption of new systems.
6
H.R. 7152
7
H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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and began to formally consider the merits of the bill on March
30, 1964. Meanwhile, a bipartisan group led by Senators
Dirksen, Mansfield, Humphrey, and Kuchel worked to reach
agreement on amendments to the House bill which would ensure its passage. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 431, 445 (1966). The MansfieldDirksen compromise, which contained § 703(h), was introduced on the Senate floor in the form of a substitute bill on
May 24, 1964. 8 Prior to the introduction of the MansfieldDirksen substitute, supporters of the House bill responded to
charges that it would destroy existing seniority rights. 9 On
April 8, 1964 Senator Clark made a speech in which he concluded that "the bill will not affect seniority at all." llO
Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964). In support of his conclusion, he inserted three documents into the Congressional Record which
this Court has characterized as "authoritative indicators" of
the purpose of§ 703(h), 10 Teamsters v. United States, supra,
at 352 (1977), and which the court below relied upon for its
conclusion that post-Act seniority systems were not intended
to be protected by§ 703(h). See 634 F. 2d at 749-750, n. 5.
The first document was a Justice Department memorandum which stated, in part, that "Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it takes effect." 11
110 Cong. Rec. 11926, 11931 (1964).
'For examples of charges that the bill would destroy existing seniority
rights see, e. g., H.R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-66 (1963)
(Minority Report); 110 Cong. Rec. 486--489 (1964) (Remarks of Sen. Hill);
110 Cong. Rec. 11741 (1964) (Remarks of Sen. Javits discussing charges
made by Governor Wallace).
0
' Senator Humphrey, one of the drafters of the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute, explained that § 703(h) did not alter the meaning of Title VII but
"merely clarifie[d] its present intent and effect. 110 Cong. Rec. 12723
(1964). Therefore statements made prior to the introduction of§ 703(h) by
proponents of Title VII are evidence of the meaning of § 703(h).
11
110 Cong. Rec. 7207. The full text of the statement with respect to
seniority may be found in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424
U. S. 747, 760 n. 16 (1976).
8
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The second document was an interpretive memorandum
which had been prepared by Senator Clark and Senator
Case, and it also said Title VII would "have no effect on established seniority rights." 12 Senator Clark also introduced
written answers to questions propounded by Senator Dirksen
which included the statement, "Seniority rights are in no way
affected by the bill." 13
On the basis of the statements that Title VII would not affect "existing'' and "established" seniority rights, petitioners
infer that Title VII would affect seniority rights which were
not "established" or "existing'' when the Act became effective. Such an inference is unjustified. While the materials
which Senator Clark inserted into the Congressional Record
did speak in terms of Title VII not affecting "vested," "existing," or "established" seniority rights, they did so because
they were responding to a specific charge made by the bill's
opponents, namely that the bill would destroy existing seniority rights. Had Senator Clark intended the bill not protect post-Act seniority systems, it is highly unlikely he would
have stated on the floor of the Senate that "the bill would not
affect seniority at all," 14 110 Cong. Rec. 7207 (1964), or introduced a written response to a question posed by Senator
Dirksen which said:
"Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill if
under a 'last hired, first fired' agreement, a Negro hap110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964). The full text of the statement with respect to seniority may be found in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,
supra, at 759 n. 15.
13
110 Cong. Rec. 7217 (1964). The questions and answers with respect
to seniority may be found in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,
supra, 760-761 n. 16.
14
Strictly speaking, Senator Clark's statement that Title VII would not
affect seniority is incorrect. Title VII does affect seniority rights, for
Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, allows awards of retroactive seniority to victims of unlawful discrimination. However, Senator
Clark's technical error does not alter our conclusion that he and other key
proponents of the bill intended that it have minimal impact on seniority
systems.
12
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pens to be the 'last hired,' he can still be 'first fired' so
long as it is done because of his status as 'last hired' and
not because of his race." I d., at 7217.
Petitioners' argument also ignores numerous other references to seniority by proponents of Title VII which were
couched in terms of "seniority" rather than "existing seniority rights." See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 5423 (1964) (remarks
of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 6554 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel);
id., at 6665-6666 (memorandum prepared by House Republican sponsors); id., at 11768 (remarks of Sen. McGovern). In
addition, the few references to seniority after § 703(h) was
added to the bill are to the effect that "the Senate substitute
bill expressly protects valid seniority systems." I d., at
14329 (letter from Senator Dicksen to Senator Williams).
See also id., at 14331 (remarks of Senator Williams).
Going behind the plain language of a statute in search of a
possibly contrary Congresional intent is "a step to be taken
cautiously" even under the best of circumstances. Piper v.
Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U. S. 1, 26 (1977). "[I]n light of
its unusual legislative history and the absence of the usual
legislative materials," Franks v. Bowman Construction Co.,
supra, at 761, we would in any event hesitate to give dispositive weight to the legislative history of § 703(h). More importantly, however, the history of§ 703(h) does not support
the far-reaching limitation on the terms of§ 703(h) announced
by the court below and urged by petitioners. The fragments
of legislative history cited by petitioners, regardless of how
liberally they are constructed, do not amount to a "clearly expressed legislative intent contrary the plain language of the
statute." Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE
Sylvania, supra, at 108.
IV
Our prior decisions have emphasized that "seniority systems are afforded special treatment under Title VII itself,"
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U. S. 63, 81
(1977), and have refused to narrow § 703(h) by reading into it
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limitations not contained in the statutory language. In
Teamsters v. United States, supra, we held that§ 703(h) exempts from Title VII the disparate impact of a bona fide seniority system even if the differential treatment is the result
of an intent to discriminate on racial grounds. Similarly, by
holding that "[a] discriminatory act which is not made the
basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was passed,"
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553, 558 (1977),
the Court interpreted § 703(h) to immunize seniority systems
which perpetuate post-Act discrimination. Thus taken together, Teamsters and Evans stand for the proposition
stated in Teamsters that "[s]ection 703(h) on its face immunizes all bona fide seniority systems, and does not distinguish
between the perpetuation of pre- and post-Act" discriminatory impact. Teamsters, supra, at 348 n. 30 (emphasis
added). 15 Section 703(h) makes no distinction between seniority system adopted before its effective date and those
5
' Nowhere in Teamsters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324 (1977), does the
Court indicate when the seniority system at issue there was adopted, and
examination of the record illustrates the difficulty of fixing an adoption
date. Article V of the National Motor Freight Agreement of 1964 contains
a seniority provision subject to modification by area agreements and local
union riders. See Brief for Petitioner Teamsters 24-25. However, Na·tional Motor Freight Agreements are of 3-year duration, and the 1970
Agreement was in effect when the complaint was filed. If a seniority system ceases to exist when the collective bargaining agreement which creates it lapses, then the seniority system in Teamsters was adopted postTitle VII. On the other hand, if in practice the seniority system was
continuously in effect from 1964, it can be argued that its adoption predates Title VII. However, Teamsters places no importance on the date
the seniority system was adopted, and we follow Teamsters by refusing to
distinguish among seniority systems based on date of adoption. Given the
difficulty of determining when one seniority system ends and another begins and the lack of legislative guidance, we think it highly unlikely Congress intended for courts to distinguish between pre-Act and post-Act seniority systems.
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adopted after its effective date. Consistent with our prior
decisions, we decline petitioners' invitation to read such a distinction into the statute.
Seniority provisions are of "overriding importance" in collective bargaining, Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 346
(1964), and they "are universally included in these contracts." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, supra, at
79. See also Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and
Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1532,
1534 (1962). The collective bargaining process "lies at the
core of our national labor policy.... " Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, supra, at 79. See, e. g., 29 U. S. C.
§ 151. Congress was well aware in 1964 that the overall purpose of Title VII, to eliminate discrimination i:n employment,
inevitably would, on occasion, conflict with the policy favoring minimal supervision by courts and other governmental
agencies over the substantive terms of collective bargaining
agreements. California Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U. S.
598, 606 (1980). Section 703(h) represents the balance Congress struck between the two policies, and it is not this
Court's function to upset that balance.
Because a construction of § 703(h) limiting its application to
seniority systems in place prior to the effective date of the
statute would be contrary to its plain language, inconsistent
with our prior cases, and would run counter to the national
labor policy, we vacate the judgment below and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 16
So ordered.

"All parties agree that on remand the court should decide whether the
lines of progression are part of a seniority system, and if so, whether they
are bona fide within the meaning of§ 703(h). We decline to reach those
issues because, as the court below noted, their resolution requires additional factual development. See 634 F . 2d 744, 749 n. 3.
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